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Students’ Engagement and Information-Seeking Behavior 
During A High School-Matching Process  
 
 
America’s rising inequality in educational opportunities, by income, not only 
takes place across its public-school districts, it also takes place within them. In many of 
the nation’s large urban school districts, high-quality schools are often located in high-
income neighborhoods and low-quality schools are located in low-income neighborhoods 
(Duncan and Murnane, 2011).  
Many argue that districts’ traditional public-school assignment processes 
exacerbate and institutionalize these unequal educational opportunities by setting 
students’ default schooling option as their neighborhood high school.  Such assignment 
processes allow middle-class families who are seeking high-quality public-school options 
for their children to “vote with their feet” and live in high-rent areas of the district, while 
low-income families can only live in low-rent areas (Hirschman, 1970).  The resulting 
concentration of social and economic capital in high-rent areas acts to enhance the 
neighborhood’s school quality through a few mechanisms: families use their social 
capital to demand and acquire additional amenities for their schools; families have the 
economic resources to supplement their child’s daily school curriculum with additional 
after-school and summer activities (Reardon, 2011); and, because they will pay the same 
amount but offer a more heavily-resourced environment, these schools attract a greater 
proportion of the high-quality public-school teachers within the district (Loeb, S., & 
Reininger, M., 2004, Darling-Hammond and Post, 2000).  
 Recently, many districts have attempted to decrease these neighborhood-based 
inequalities by implementing centralized intra-district school-choice processes. While 
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their specific designs may differ, districts hope that by creating a central, institutionalized 
process for pairing students with schools based on students’ and parents’ schooling 
preferences rather than their residential location, they will be able to give all families 
within their district the opportunity to select the high-quality school option that is best for 
their child (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth & Sonmez, 2006).  
While intra-district school-choice systems may enhance the schooling options 
available to many families, they also raise potentially important equity concerns. If the 
processes for applying to high-quality schools are either overly complicated or vague, 
they may still privilege the elite who have bureaucratic connections and experience 
navigating similar systems (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth & Sonmez, 2006). In addition, 
if information on school quality is difficult to attain or understand, they may privilege 
wealthier families and/or parents with higher education levels who have a lower cost to 
attaining and assimilating such information (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008). Finally, 
underlying such systems is the question – should all students and parents have the same 
definition of “school quality” and rank schools similarly, or by investigating a students’ 
schooling options can families find a unique, “best match” school for their student?  
In this paper, I use one large district’s implementation of a district-wide high-
school assignment process designed to increase all students’ school options to investigate 
families’ engagement with the school-choice process and whether this engagement 
increases students’ subsequent academic attainment. I do so by focusing on a specific set 
of high schools in the district that incentivized students to make contact with them during 
the high-school selection process by offering an admissions priority to students who 
made contact. Within this context I investigate whether students with particular 
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characteristics, such as high family-income levels or high eighth-grade test scores, were 
more likely to make contact with and acquire information about their high-school 
selections than students with low family-income levels or low eighth-grade test scores. 
Next, I investigate whether making contact increases students’ probability of future 
academic success by attempting to identify a casual relationship between making contact 
and a decreased probability of students dropping out of school and/or an increased 
probability of students graduating high school in four years. In these analyses, I control 
for the measurable student characteristics that predict whether a student will make contact 
(detected in the earlier analysis), in an attempt remove any observed selection bias from 
my identification of the relationship between making contact and students’ on-time high 
school graduation.  
In the remainder of this paper, I describe the economic theory behind intra-district 
school-choice processes and place my work in the context of the existing empirical 
evidence on families’ behavior during school-choice processes; I describe my site, 
student sample and analytic approach; I present my findings; I discuss threats to the 
validity of my findings; and I conclude with a discussion of their implications and 
potential next steps for the field.  
 
Background and Context 
 
In the past two decades, an increasing number of urban districts have adopted 
intra-district school-choice systems in effort to increase their overall level of educational 
quality and reduce disparities in educational opportunity, by income. In an effort to bring 
attention to this movement in 2010 the Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings 
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began ranking school-district choice systems by their available school options and 
processes for matching students to schools. In their annual reports, the Center has found 
that, to date, 106 districts that have implemented such systems. Additionally, every year 
since 2010 at least one large urban district has adopted an intra-district choice process 
(Whitehurst, 2014).  
One early adopter of intra-district school-choice processes, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, instituted a process in 2002 and has been the site of most research on 
family’s behaviors during such processes. Specifically, in studying the introduction of the 
process, Deming and his colleagues (2014) found that when offered the option, students 
from low-income homes in that district did indeed choose a higher-quality (as measured 
by a combination of student, teacher and postsecondary performance statistics) school 
over their neighborhood high school.  
Other research conducted in Charlotte-Mecklenburg points to the importance of 
accessing information on school quality during the school-selection process. Specifically, 
when Hastings and Weinstein (2008) distributed easy-to-comprehend statistics on 
schools’ state-standardized test performance to randomly selected low-income families, 
families that received the additional information had a higher probability of choosing 
schools with high-scoring student bodies for their children than families that only had 
access to the complex publicly available data. Follow-up research by Hastings and her 
colleagues (2009) examining heterogeneity in choice behavior among families in the 
district found that when students’ families reported placing a heavy weight on a school’s 
academic achievement data, after going to their preferred school the students experienced 
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test score gains, whereas students from families that did not place a heavy weight on the 
school’s academic achievement record did not.   
Hastings’ research suggests that increasing the information available to students 
prior to the choice process caused them to choose higher-performing schools and that for 
those that reported using the information to make their choices, it also improved their 
future academic performance. It does not address which families would seek out this 
information if they knew it existed and could easily be made available to them. In 
addition, it is unknown whether all students would do better by going to these schools, or 
if there is an additional component of this process – the quality of the student-school 
“match”.  
There is little research on the quality of student-school matches within school-
choice processes, but some of those observing and working within school-choice systems 
believe that requiring students to connect with schools before making decisions (rather 
than just going off of published school-performance statistics) is essential for both 
parties. They argue that the connection allows schools to communicate their academic 
focus and behavior expectations to families before the match has already been made and 
it allows students to determine if they will be successful academically within such an 
environment. Specifically, in 2005, the director of one district’s school-choice process 
stated that “not all schools are the right fit for all students” and that school-choice 
systems must have built-in mechanisms for encouraging schools and families to 
communicate with each other prior to the selection process. Unfortunately, parents from 
the same district reported that it is often hard to navigate the process and difficult to find 
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information on whether schools offer programs for at-risk students, English-language 
learners or students with special needs (Hemphill and Nauer, 2009).   
Although compelling, the argument that providing school choice may increase all 
students’ academic achievement warrants more research. In her paper, “When Can Public 
Policymakers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provision of Social Services,” 
Rebecca Blank (2000) highlights the dangers of leaving the provision of social services to 
competitive markets like school-choice processes. Blank suggests that there are high 
probabilities of the process failing because of different levels of information accessed by 
participants. In particular, she argues that when the quality of the service provided is 
difficult to observe (as it is when trying to discern school quality and the appropriate 
student-school match), it is very difficult for participants to choose the best option and so 
the fairness promised by the market structure breaks down (Blank, 2000). 
 If the market structure underlying school-choice processes break down it can lead 
to unexpected and unintended consequences for school districts implementing intra-
district choice systems. For example, when school quality is difficult for students and 
parents to observe, and if information on school quality is more available to some 
families than to others, the intra-district school-choice process may advantage one set of 
parents and students over another unintentionally. In the worst case, if high-income or 
high-achieving students and their families are able to access information on school 
performance more easily than others in the district and make informed decisions 
regarding where they will be most successful, either because of their higher-education 
levels or connections with other informed families, a district-wide school-choice process 
may contribute to the sorting of high-income and high-achieving students into the 
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highest-performing schools and the neediest student populations into the lowest-
performing schools.   
Conclusion:  Specific Research Questions 
In this paper I investigate these issues by conducting a case study in which I 
examine eighth-graders’ engagement and information-gathering behavior during an intra-
district school-choice process in the nation’s largest urban district – the New York City 
school district. I focus on the 2004 implementation of an intra-district school-choice 
process for all 70,000 eighth-graders in New York City public schools and a set of over 
100 small schools specifically created during this time period to promote student 
engagement and information-seeking behavior during the high school choice process.  As 
I describe in Appendix A, the new intra-district school-choice system required all eighth-
graders to create a “choice list” of up to 12 high schools; allowed high schools to rank 
students based on their predetermined selectivity criteria; and matched students to 
schools based on a complex algorithm developed to optimize student-school pairings 
(Quint, Smith, Unterman and Moedano, 2010).  As I describe in Appendix B, this set of 
over 100 newly-created small high schools were unique within the district, in that while 
they were small and focused on promoting an academically rigorous curriculum, they did 
not screen students based on their prior academic performance (unlike other similarly-
sized schools).  For this reason researchers refer to these schools as NYC’s “small 
schools of choice” (SSCs) (Bloom and Unterman, 2014).  
SSC’s unique student-screening preference is particularly relevant to the focus of 
this paper. Rather than screening students academically, SSCs gave priority to students 
who had made explicit contact with them during their eighth-grade school year either by 
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attending either a school open-house or by visiting their booth at a district-sponsored 
high-school fair (Bloom, Thompson and Unterman, 2010).   Using data collected by the 
high school choice process administrators during its 2004 implementation, I investigate 
whether -- among students who included at least one SSC in their choice list – students 
with particular characteristics, such as those with high family-income levels or high 
eighth-grade test scores, were more likely to make contact with and acquire information 
about their high-school selections than students with low family-income levels or low 
eighth-grade test scores. Thus, I first address the following research question: 
1. Do students with particular characteristics have a higher probability of making 
contact with at least one school on their choice list than other students? In 
particular, do higher-income and higher-academically achieving students have 
higher probabilities than other students of making contact? 
Then, in follow-up analyses, I investigate the casual relationship between whether 
a student choosing to make contact with at least one of the schools on their choice list in 
eighth-grade increases the probability of their future academic success. Specifically, I 
address the follow research questions: 
2. Does making contact with at least one school on a student’s choice list 
increase a student’s probability of graduating high school in four years? Does 
it decrease their probability of dropping out of high school? 
Notice that, in addressing my first question, I treat contact as an outcome: did a 
student contact at least one school on their choice list or not, during eighth grade.  In my 
second set of analyses, on the other hand, I treat the same variable – contact – 
subsequently as an exogenous question predictor and attempt to identify whether making 
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contact with a school on their choice list causes students to have a higher probability of 
graduating high school in four years.  Unfortunately, the variable is unlikely to be 
exogenous in these analyses as it is a consequence of a choice process in which the 
student has engaged. Thus, it is possible that any detected relationship between contact 
and ultimate high-school graduation is a consequence of important omitted explanations 
that drive both contact and graduation.  To better estimate the relationship between 
contact and four-year high school graduation, I apply what I learned in answering my 
first research question about the selection process that drives contact to reduce or 
eliminate the potential selection bias. Specifically, in analyses to address my second 
research question, I control for the observed predictors of contact in an effort to remove 
observed bias introduced by the potential endogeneity of contact. In this approach I 
borrow from the analytic framework often used in propensity-score matching approaches 
(Murnane and Willett, 2011) as well as the extensive literature on estimating returns to an 
additional year of education using Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques. I 
discuss potential problems with this approach in the Threats to Validity section that 
follows my findings.  
 
Research Design 
Dataset  
To address my research questions, I have analyzed a dataset from the New York 
City High-School Application-Processing System (HSAPS).  It contains the high-school 
preferences of all eighth graders who attended NYC public schools and participated in 
the main round of the 2004-2005 high-school application process.  To follow these 
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students from first contact through high school, I linked these HSAPS data to NYC DOE 
school records that contain data on students’ high-school enrollment and New York State 
high-school diploma attainment. In Appendix C, I describe each data source that 
contributed to my final dataset and I list the specific steps that made up my dataset-
merging process. 
Sample 
Of the 70,825 NYC public-school eighth-graders in 2004-20051, nine percent 
(6,333) selected a small school of choice as their most-preferred school and 38 percent 
(26,813) selected a SSC as at least one of their twelve high-school choices. In order to 
focus my analysis on the contact preference exerted by SSCs, I conducted analyses in the 
latter self-selected sample of 26,813 students who included at least one SSC among their 
list of twelve potential high-school choices. This self-selection of participants into the 
analytic sample, by virtue of choices made during district’s eighth-grade high-school 
selection process, limits the generalizability of my findings to a population of similar 
self-selected students. I discuss this issue of external validity in greater detail in the 
Threats to Validity section that follows the presentation of my findings.  
Of the 26,813 students in my analytic sample, the majority listed at least two 
SSCs on their school-choice list (41 percent listed one SSC, 25 percent listed two SSCs, 
15 percent listed three SSCs, 10 percent listed four SSCs and the remaining nine percent 
listed five or more SSCs). The selected SSCs were distributed relatively evenly across 
students’ choice lists.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Though students from private and parochial schools in NY can participate in the high school application 
process I do not include non-NYC public school eighth-graders in my analysis. 
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Overall, students in the analytic sample were from low-income families and 
exhibited at least one indicator of having struggled academically in 8th grade. 
Specifically, 81 percent of the students qualified for free-/reduced-price lunch; 67 percent 
scored below proficient on their eighth-grade state-administered English Language Arts 
examination; and 69 percent scored below proficient on their eighth-grade state-
administered Mathematics examination. In addition, 22 percent of the students were 
overage for eighth-grade, suggesting that these students may have been retained in grade 
at least once in elementary and middle school. In terms of other demographic 
characteristics (as defined by NYC DOE school records), 49 percent of the students were 
male; approximately 44 percent were Black, 47 percent were Hispanic, five percent were 
White and three percent were Asian. Eight percent of the students were English-language 
learners and 16 percent qualified for special-education services.  
Measures 
I obtained the New York City High School Application Processing System (NYC 
HSAPS) data as a student-level (multivariate-choice) dataset, to which each student 
contributed a single row, their high-school choices being described by the values of 
twelve variables named choice1 through choice12. I created the following set of 
measures from the dataset to address my first research question:  
• Outcome Contact is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a student made contact 
with at least one SSC on their choice list (=1; 0 otherwise). 
• In addressing this question, I hypothesized that selected theoretically-supported 
family, personal, and prior academic characteristics of students distinguished those 
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who chose to make contact with an SSC from those who did not.  Based on my 
review of the literature, I include the following characteristics: 
o Question predictor FRLunch is a dichotomous indicator of whether a student 
qualified for free-/reduced-price lunch based on their family’s income level in 
eighth-grade (=1; 0 otherwise).  
o Question predictor PriorM is a continuous variable that records a student’s 
eighth-grade mathematics score on the state-administered norm-referenced 
test. Scores ranged from a lowest obtainable scaled score of 517 to a highest 
obtainable scaled score of 882.  The sample mean was 718 with a standard 
deviation of 40.78. According to the test-makers CTB/McGraw Hill (2005b), 
the eighth-grade mathematics exam is internally consistent and highly reliable 
(Feldt-Raju reliability estimate=	  0.94). To facilitate my interpretation of the 
model’s parameter estimates I have standardized this question predictor on the 
sample mean and standard deviation.  
o Question predictor PriorR is a continuous variable that records a student’s 
eighth-grade English-Language Arts (ELA) score on the state-administered 
norm-referenced test. Scores on this test range from a lowest obtainable scaled 
score of 527 to a highest obtainable scaled score of 830.  The sample mean 
was 698 with a standard deviation of 35.98. According to the test-makers 
CTB/McGraw Hill (2005a), the eighth-grade ELA exam is internally 
consistent and highly reliable (Feldt-Raju reliability estimate=	  0.90). To 
facilitate my interpretation of the model’s parameter estimates I have 
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standardized this question predictor on the sample mean and standard 
deviation. 
o Question predictor Absent is a continuous variable that records the number of 
times a student was absent from school in eighth-grade. The number of 
absences in this sample range from zero to 160 with a mean of 16 and a 
standard deviation of 15. To facilitate my interpretation of the model’s 
parameter estimates I have standardized this question predictor on the sample 
mean and standard deviation. 
o Question predictor Overage is a dichotomous indicator describing whether a 
student had been retained in grade at least once, prior to the eighth-grade, 
based on whether a student was older than 13 at the start of their eighth-grade 
school year (=1; 0 otherwise).  
o Question predictor English-language learner (ELL) is dichotomous indicator 
of whether the student was identified by their eighth-grade guidance counselor 
as an ELL student (=1; 0 otherwise).  
o Question predictor Special Education (SPED) is a dichotomous variable 
recording whether a student was identified by their eighth-grade guidance 
counselor as qualifying for special-education services (=1; 0 otherwise).  
To address my second research question, in which the former outcome, contact, 
now serves as a question predictor, I merged the NYC HSAPS data with students’ 2005-
2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009 New York City Department of Education (NYC 
DOE) enrollment and discharge files by each student’s unique district identifier.  If a 
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student had graduated2, dropped out or moved away during this time period, this was 
indicated by exit codes on their discharge file.  
I created the following set of measures from this dataset (note that some of the 
variables included in analyses for the second research questions also appeared in analyses 
to address the first research question):  
• Outcome Graduate4, created from the NYC DOE discharge file data, is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether a student graduated from any NYC public high 
school on time, in four years from entry (=1; 0 otherwise). A student received a value 
of 1 for Graduated4 if the NYC DOE discharge files indicated that they graduated 
high school within the study period. A student received a value of 0 for Graduated if 
their NYC discharge files indicated that they dropped out of high school during the 
study period or they were still enrolled in the NYC DOE public schools at the end of 
the study period but had not graduated after four years. Roughly 20 percent of the 8th 
graders district-wide that participated in the HSAPS process in 2004-2005 did not 
stay enrolled in NYC DOE public schools through four years of high school and had 
exit codes on their discharge files indicating that they either moved out of the district 
or transferred to private/parochial schools, for these students the value of the 
Graduate4 is missing. This missingness further limits the generalizability of my 
findings to those students that stay in New York City Public Schools through four 
years of high school. I discuss this issue of external validity in greater detail in the 
Threats to Validity section that follows the presentation of my findings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In order to graduate from a NYC public high school a student must attain a Local, Regents or Advanced 
Regents diploma from New York State (NYS), attainment of all diploma types is indicated on students’ 
NYC DOE discharge files. 
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• Outcome DROPOUT, created from the NYC DOE discharge file data, is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether a student dropped out from any NYC public high 
school during the study period  (=1; 0 otherwise). A student received a value of 1 for 
DROPOUT if the NYC DOE discharge files exit codes indicated that they “dropped 
out.” In addition, because schools have a strong incentive to code any student that 
leaves as something other than “dropped out” (as discussed in Murnane 2013), I also 
gave students with exit codes indicating that they transferred out of the NYC DOE a 
value of 1 for the variable DROPOUT. A student receives a value of 0 otherwise. 
• In addressing my second research question, I sought to test whether students who 
chose to make contact with a SSC prior to the onset of the choice process were more 
likely to graduate high school (or less likely to drop out of high school) in four years 
than those that did not.  
o Thus, former outcome, Contact, became a critical question predictor in the 
addressing of the second research questions, and distinguished among those 
SSC’s that the student did, and did not, contact. 
• Acknowledging that the relationship between contact and eventual graduation may 
have been a consequence of important characteristics of the student that drove both 
contact and graduation, I removed observed selection bias from my response to the 
second research questions by controlling for the critical features of the observed 
selection process that had led to students’ contacting an SSC (which I investigated in 
addressing the first research question).  Thus, explicitly, I included covariates 
FRLunch, PriorM, PriorR, ELL, SPED, all of which I had found to be statistically 
significant predictors of the process.  
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Analytic Strategy  
To address my research questions, I fit the following statistical models, refining 
them as necessary to remove un-needed predictors and controlling for important 
covariates, as specified above.  
• RQ1: Do students with particular characteristics have a higher probability of making 
contact with at least one school on their choice list than other students? In particular, 
do higher-income and higher-academically achieving students have higher 
probabilities than other students of making contact? 
To address this question, I fit the following logistic-regression model for student i: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔!( !"#$%!$!!!!"#$%!$!) =   𝐵! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑀! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅! + 𝛽!𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!+𝛽!𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐷! +𝛽!𝐸𝐿𝐿! + 𝛾𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 
Where parameters 𝛽! through 𝛽! summarize the population association between a 
student characteristics and his/her log-odds of making contact with a school prior to 
the high-school choice process. When estimates of any of these parameters were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level I concluded that there was a relationship, on 
average in the population, between the given student characteristic and whether or not 
a student made contact with a school on their choice list. All the statistically 
significant predictors of the selection process identified in this question then became 
covariates in my second analytic model. 
• RQ2: Does making contact with at least one school their choice list increase a 
student’s probability of graduating high school in four years? Does it decrease their 
probability of dropping out of high school? 
To address this question, I fit the following two logistic-regression models: 
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• 𝑙𝑜𝑔! !"#$%#&'()!!!!"#$%#&'()! =   𝐵! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑀! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅! +𝛽!𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!+𝛽!𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐷! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐿𝐿!  
where parameter 𝛽! summarizes the population association between a student making 
contact with a school and his/her log-odds of graduation high school in four years.   
• 𝑙𝑜𝑔! !"#$#%&!!!!"#$#%&! =   𝐵! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑀! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑅! +𝛽!𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!+𝛽!𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐷! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐿𝐿!  
where parameter 𝛽! summarizes the population association between a student making 
contact with a school and his/her log-odds of dropping out of school in four years.   
Notice that, in both models, I have removed observed selection bias by including the 
descriptors of the observed selection process into the contacting schools that I detected in 
my response to research question one. When parameter estimate 𝛽! was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level I concluded that there was a relationship, on average in the 
population, between a student making contact and their probability of graduating high 
school in four years, adjusting for observed selection bias.  
 
Findings 
RQ1: Probability Of Making Contact 
 In Table 1, I present parameter estimates from logistic regression analyses 
describing the fitted relationship between the probability that a student will make contact 
with a school on their choice list (vs. not make contact) and three sets of student 
characteristics – a characteristic capturing their family’s income level (whether they 
qualify for free-/reduced-price lunch), characteristics capturing their academic 
performance in eighth-grade (their eighth-grade state standardized Mathematics and 
Richard Murnane  3/27/2015 8:58 AM
Comment [1]: I	  would	  like	  to	  see	  several	  models	  presented	  and	  discussed.	  	  The	  first	  model	  would	  be	  FRlunch	  without	  the	  other	  covariates.	  	  This	  would	  tell	  me	  whether	  low-­‐income	  students	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  contact	  than	  higher	  income	  students.	  	  Then	  the	  subsequent	  models	  would	  indicate	  the	  extent	  tow	  which	  this	  difference	  by	  family	  income	  becomes	  smaller	  when	  you	  control	  for	  characteristics	  of	  students	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	  family	  income.	  
Students’ Behavior During A School-Matching Process	  
	  
21	  
English language arts scores and the number of times a student was absent in eighth-
grade) and characteristics capturing whether they have any particular educational needs 
(whether they were overage for grade in eighth-grade, whether they qualify for special-
education services and whether they are an English-language learner).  
Notice first that students from higher-income families have higher probabilities of 
making contact with schools on their choice list. Specifically, as presented in Model 1, 
with no other parameters in the model, on average the fitted odds that a student who does 
not qualify for free-/reduced-price lunch will make contact are 1.26 times the fitted odds 
that a student who does qualify for free-/reduced-price lunch will do the same (p-value < 
0.001). As other student characteristics correlated with family income, such as their 
academic performance in eighth-grade (Model 2) and specific educational needs (Model 
3) are added to the model the strength of this relationship slightly decreases but remains 
present. Thus, as seen in Model 4, controlling for students’ academic performance and 
specific educational needs, the fitted odds a student who does not qualify for free-
/reduced-price lunch will make contact are 1.17 times the fitted odds that a student who 
does qualify for free-/reduced-price lunch will do the same (p-value < 0.001). 
In addition, students that are stronger academically, as measured by their eight-
grade state standardized examination scores and eighth-grade absences, have higher 
probabilities of making contact with schools on their choice list. Controlling for all other 
characteristics (Model 4), the fitted odds that a student who scored one standard deviation 
above the mean on their eighth-grade Mathematics examination will make contact are 
1.20 times the fitted odds that a student who scored at the mean will do so (p < 0.001) 
and the fitted odds that a student who scored one standard deviation above the mean on 
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their eighth-grade English language arts examination will make contact are 1.26 times the 
fitted odds that a student who scored the mean will do so, controlling for all other 
characteristics (p < 0.001).3 Finally, students with fewer absences in eighth-grade are 
more likely to make contact than those that have many. For example, the fitted odds that 
a student with 1 absence will make contact are 1.82 times the fitted odds of making that a 
student with the sample average (16 absences) will make contact.  
Finally, controlling for other characteristics, general-education students have 
higher probabilities of making contact than do two of the academically neediest student 
subpopulations: students that are overage for grade in eighth-grade (fitted odds = 1.42 p-
value< 0.001) and students that qualify for special-education services (fitted odds=1.48 p-
value< 0.001). There is not a statistically significant difference in the fitted odds of 
making contact between general education students and students categorized as English-
language learners (fitted odds = 0.90, p =0.895).   
RQ2: Probability Of Academic Success 
Students who made contact with a school on their choice list have a higher 
probability of graduating high school on-time, in four years. In Table 2, I present 
parameter estimates from logistic regression analyses describing the fitted relationship 
between the probability that a student will graduate from any high school in the district 
within four years (vs. not graduate) and whether they made contact with a SSC on their 
choice list, in eighth-grade. In Model 1, I fit the graduation/contact relationship, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The effects of students’ prior reading and math proficiency scores on their probability of making contact 
do not differ by whether or not they are overage (tests on the requisite interactions lead to p-values of 0.52 
and 0.11, respectively).  
Students’ Behavior During A School-Matching Process	  
	  
23	  
no covariates.  In Model 2, I control for the key predictors of contact identified in 
question one, where I include the latter to remove observed bias introduced by the 
potential endogeneity in the predictor contact. In Model 1, antilogging the requisite 
parameter estimates, without control for observed selection, I find that the fitted odds that 
a student who made contact will graduate in four years are 2.24 times the fitted odds that 
a student that did not make contact will do the same (p-value < 0.001). In Model 2, after 
controlling for observed selection, the magnitude of the fitted relationship between four-
year high school graduation and contact decreases in magnitude to 1.34 but remains 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). Thus, even after removing the effect of 
observed selection , students who make contact still have over one and a quarter times the 
fitted odds of graduating high school in four years, when compared with similar students 
who did not make contact.  
Students who made contact with a school on their choice list have a lower 
probability of dropping out of high school during the study period. In Table 3, I present 
parameter estimates from logistic regression analyses describing the fitted relationship 
between the probability that a student will drop out of high school within four years (vs. 
not dropout) and whether they made contact with a SSC on their choice list, in eighth-
grade. In Model 1, I fit the graduation/contact relationship, including no covariates.  In 
Model 2, I control for the key predictors of contact identified in question one, where I 
include the latter to remove observed bias introduced by the potential endogeneity in the 
predictor contact. In Model 1, antilogging the requisite parameter estimates, without 
control for observed selection, I find that the fitted odds that a student who made contact 
will dropout of high school are 0.58 times the fitted odds that a student that did not make 
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contact will do the same (p-value < 0.001). In Model 2, after controlling for observed 
selection, the magnitude of the fitted relationship between four-year high school 
graduation and contact decreases in magnitude to 0.68 but remains statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.001). Thus, even after removing the effect of observed selection, students 
who make contact still have a dramatically lower probability of dropping out of school in 
four years, when compared similar students who did not make contact.  
 
Threats to Validity 	  
Four weaknesses in my research design and data analysis affect all the findings 
that I present in this paper.  
First, as described earlier, of the 70,825 NYC public-school eighth-graders in 
2004-20054, only 38 percent (26,813) selected a SSC as at least one of their twelve high-
school choices. Because SSCs are the only schools in the district that identify students as 
having made contact with them, or not, my research sample is therefore limited to these 
26,813 students who included	  at	  least	  one	  SSC	  on	  their	  list	  of	  twelve	  potential	  high	  school	  choices. This means that the sample whose choices I have described in this paper 
is self-selected, based on students’ high school preferences, and my findings cannot be 
generalized to the broader population of all students or schools participating in a high-
school choice process.  Rather, they must be limited to the self-selected population of 
students who would make such choices and the schools that these students chose. 5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Though students from private and parochial schools in NY can participate in the high school application 
process I do not include non-NYC public school eighth-graders in my analysis. 5	  All of the SSCs in operation during this time period are represented by the analysis sample. In total, of 
these 110 SSCs (out of 365 public high schools in NYC), ninety of them were attended by both students 	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Second, the generalizability of my findings is constrained by limitations in the 
availability of my sample’s four-year follow-up data. Specifically, approximately 27 
percent of the eighth-graders district-wide who participated in the HSAPS process in 
2004-2005 did not remain in NYC public schools through four years of high school.  The 
exit codes on their discharge files indicate that they either moved out of the district or 
transferred to private/parochial schools. Thus, these students cannot be included in the 
sample when conducting analyses to address my second set of research questions, as data 
on their high-school graduation is missing. In Appendix E, in follow-up analyses, I 
investigate whether it is possible to predict whether there is a relationship between a 
student having made contact with a SSC on their choice list in eighth-grade and departure 
from the sample (i.e., missingness on the outcome).  Fortunately, I cannot detect one. 
Regardless, I regard the generalizability of my findings as being limited to those students 
who remained in the New York City Public Schools for all four years of high school. 
Third, whether or not a student made contact with one of these schools through an 
open house or a school fair cannot be considered a perfect proxy for whether they 
acquired information on the particular school.  The reason is that there are other ways 
students could have acquired some information about the school. For example, they could 
have heard about the school through friends or read about it online or in the high-school 
handout. Alternatively, they could have attended an open house, but learned very little 
about the school. Thus, I must regard contact as a noisy measure of whether a student 
acquired information about a school during the selection process and I expect this noise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that did, and did not, make contact with them in advance, and 11 were attended solely by students that did 
make contact with the school prior to the choice process.	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to have attenuated (negatively biased) any relationship that I detected in investigating the 
relationship between contact and graduation in addressing my second research questions.   
Finally, in addressing my second research questions and investigating the 
relationship between contact with the school and subsequent high-school graduation, I 
have treated contact – a critical variable that describes student selections – as an 
exogenous predictor.  However, in the transition to high-school, because students chose 
to make contact with a SSC and also chose to graduate from the high-school they 
attended, it may be that – in these analyses – predictor contact is endogenous. My 
estimate of the relationship between contact and graduation is therefore potentially biased 
by this selection. I have attempted to ameliorate this bias by determining -- in analyses 
for my first research question -- descriptors of the process of contact, and then including 
them subsequently as covariates in analyses to address my second research questions. 
These latter descriptors of predictors (FRLunch, PriorM, PriorR, ELL, SPED), in 
essence, provide me with a model of the selection process that led to contact and their 
inclusion in the second round of analyses thereby removes the observed bias due to them, 
from my estimate of the relationship between contact and graduation. If I were able to 
fully describe – that is, determine all such descriptors -- of the selection process that lead 
to students making contact and include them in subsequent analyses to address research 
question two, then my estimates of the relationship between contact and four-year high 
school graduation would provide an unbiased estimate of the impact of making contact 
with an SSC on the probability of graduating from high school on time. Unfortunately, 
this assumption (of unconfoundedness) is a strong assumption and may not be tenable.  It 
is likely that immeasurable characteristics, such as family attitudes towards education and 
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student motivation, will also push students to both make contact and ultimately graduate 
from high-school on time. If this is the case, then my estimates of the impact of contact 
on on-time graduation in the second round of analyses remain biased and my estimate of 
the effect of contact on four-year high school graduation may appear greater than it is, in 
reality.  
In essence, my estimates of the impact of contact on on-time high school 
graduation may be plagued by a bias analogous to the infamous “ability bias” plaguing 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates of the returns to education. In each 
case, an immeasurable characteristic may be related to the question predictor and the 
outcome of interest. In his 1999 review of the literature on the casual effects of education 
on earnings, Card concludes that the OLS regression estimates of the returns to education 
are between 10-20 percent higher than estimates from more rigorous research designs. 
While is not clear whether the potential bias in my approach would be greater than this 
range, it may be able to serve as a helpful reference point for my estimated effects.  
	  
Discussion 
 
In exploring the behavior of students and parents in NYC, I find that among 
students who included at least one SSC on their high-school choice list, it was those who 
were better-off economically and higher-performing academically that made contact with 
schools prior to the HSAPS process. I also find suggestive evidence that, within this 
group, students that make contact have a markedly higher probability of graduating from 
high school in four years and a markedly lower probability of dropping out of high school 
than those who do not make this contact.  
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My findings suggest that either making contact with at least one school helps a 
student learn information that informs all their high-school choices, or that the contact 
students within this sample all share a different, unobservable trait, one that both helps 
them successfully navigate the eighth-grade high school choice process and stay on-track 
through high-school. Patillo (2014), has qualitatively studied the introduction of charter 
schools in Chicago and finds that students who navigate choice systems successfully have 
families with strong social networks that they can rely on for information about the 
process and often have a highly-engaged family member providing them with guidance. 
While a complementary qualitative study would be necessary to come to the same 
conclusion in this setting, these results support each other.  
More work needs to be done to determine how students learn about the school-
choice process requirements and are incentivized to connect with schools they may want 
to attend. While it is clear why schools prioritize students that make efforts to connect 
with them – these students are signaling that they are a good fit for the school and 
understand the school’s academic requirements – these preferences may disadvantage 
lower-income, less academically-focused students that do not have the social capital or 
familial support necessary to navigate the process. Depending on district officials’ goals, 
identifying the source of this missed opportunity may have important implications for the 
design and implementation of future school-choice systems. 
Appendix A: The New York City High-School Application Process 
 Prior to the institution of a district-wide high-school application process in the fall 
of 2003, New York City’s selective-enrollment schools all had their own admissions 
processes and students had to apply to each school separately.  This system was chaotic 
and advantaged the students and parents who spent time tracking each school’s unique 
application requirements and deadlines.  This decentralized process resulted in a select 
set of 17,000 elite students being accepted to multiple selective-enrollment schools; 
another set of roughly 33,000 students and parents being waitlisted and forced to monitor 
each school’s process closely for an opportunity for their children to be assigned; and left 
a set of roughly 30,000 parents and students assigned to schools that they did not indicate 
a preference for (Abdulkadı̇roğlu et al., 2005).  
 In the spring of 2003, the New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE) 
asked Abdulkadı̇roğlu and others to design a new, centralized school-matching process. 
Abdulkadı̇roğlu et al. based the new matching process on the commonly known medical-
school matching process. In the new system both students and schools exerted 
preferences and an advanced algorithm created a stable match, one in which no 
unmatched student-school pair would rather be with each other than with their 
assignment. It is also a student-proposing process, which made it a dominant strategy for 
students to state their true preferences (Abdulkadı̇roğlu et al., 2005).  
In the most simple terms, in a student’s eighth-grade school year they were given 
a book of all their 400+ high-school options and encouraged to learn as much as they can 
about them by speaking with their guidance counselor, visiting a high-school fair, or 
attending school open houses. In the spring of their eighth-grade year, they submitted to 
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their guidance counselor an ordered ranking of up to twelve high schools that they would 
like to attend. The guidance counselors turned these lists into the NYC DOE and in turn, 
the NYC DOE provided all high schools with lists of the students that selected them 
(without being shown the student’s ranking).  The schools then ranked these students 
based on their own admissions criteria.  Some schools were “selective” academically and 
ranked students one-by-one according to their eighth-grade academic performance.  
Other schools were classified as “unscreened” or “limited unscreened”. NYC’s Small 
Schools of Choice (SSCs) were “limited unscreened” schools; rather than ranking 
students they gave a 0/1 priority to students that made contact with them during the fall of 
their eighth-grade school year and/or a 0/1 priority to students that lived within the 
neighborhood surrounding the school6.  After receiving each set of rankings the High 
School Application Processing System (HSAPS) algorithm attempted to match each 
student to their highest-ranked school. If there were more students that ranked a school 
and met its priorities then the school could serve, the algorithm used a random process to 
break ties between students.  If a student lost the opportunity to be assigned to a given 
school, the algorithm then attempted to match the student to the next-most preferred 
school on their choice list. This process is repeated until all possible students were 
matched to schools on their choice list.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 SSCs can classify students in up to three geographic priorities, though using two – (1) for students who 
either in the surrounding geographic catchment area and (0) for those who do not – is the most common.  
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Appendix B: New York City’s Small Schools of Choice 
 When the NYC DOE implemented the new intra-district school-choice process it 
also took additional measures to improve all students’ access to high-quality schools. In 
particular, in 2003 the NYC DOE targeted over 28 large high schools with graduation 
rates below 40 percent for closure and replaced them (in the same neighborhoods and 
sometimes the same school buildings) with new small schools. MDRC researchers Bloom 
et al. (2010) studied these new small schools and called them “small schools of choice” 
(SSCs).  As of the fall of 2008 there were 123 SSCs in operation in NYC. On average, 
SSCs served approximately 100 students per grade and did not screen students on their 
prior academic achievement (unlike most other small schools in the city). Almost all of 
these new small schools received roughly $400,000 in additional funds from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation during their first four years of operation and they strove to 
create curricula and school settings that focused on the Foundation’s philosophy of 
“rigor, relevance and relationships.”  Recent experimental (Bloom et al., 2010) and quasi-
experimental (Stiefel, 2012) evidence demonstrated that the SSCs created during this 
time period led to improved student academic achievement and were a high-quality 
education option for students living in these areas. 
SSC’s “School Contact” Preference 
 A distinguishing feature of NYC’s SSCs was that, unlike other schools in the city, 
they did not screen students based on their prior academic achievement. Instead, NYC’s 
SSCs ranked students according to two criteria – whether they lived in the geographic 
catchment area for the school and whether they made contact with the school during the 
fall of their eighth-grade school year.  Students and parents could “make contact” with an 
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SSC by signing in at its high-school fair booth, attending a school open house, or calling 
the school to learn more about its program offerings (New York City Department of 
Education, 2012).  
The purpose and function of SSC’s geographic priority preference was clear - it 
ensured that students who previously would have attended the large high schools targeted 
for closure in the neighborhood of the new small schools received preference in the 
school-assignment process and had access to these new educational offerings.  The theory 
behind SSCs’ “school contact” preference, and how it affected students and parents, was 
less clear. The preference incentivized students and parents to connect with high schools, 
and while doing so, acquire information about the high-school setting and if it is the right 
match for them.  Theoretically, this information helped students decide where they would 
optimize their learning and helped them create an informed choice list.   
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Appendix C: Data Sources and Merging Procedures 
I brought together multiple New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE) 
data sources to trace students from their participation in the 2004-2005 high-school 
application process in the spring of their 8th grade year through four years of high school.  
The 2004-2005 HSAPS process was the second implementation year of full intra-district 
school-choice in NYC. I chose to focus on the second implementation year rather than 
the first because in 2003-2004 the admissions procedures for new SSCs were not 
universally advertised to parents and students and there was still some confusion (felt by 
both students/parents and schools) as to how HSAPS functioned.7 In Figure C.1 I 
describe each data source I use in my analysis – HSAPS, NYC DOE school records data, 
NYC school progress reports and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation information - and 
document their structure and the years for which they were available.  
My first key dataset was 2004-2005 administrative data from the New York City 
high-school application process. These data were available as a student-level file, with 
one row per student, identifying each student by their unique district id. Each student row 
contained a list of their first through twelfth choice and the preferences they were given 
by each school. There was also information about each student’s eighth-grade 
performance on a state-mandated standardized English-Language Arts and Mathematics 
examination, their race, gender and free-/reduced-price lunch qualification status.  
As a first step, I identified which student choices were for small schools of choice 
using a combination of public information on each school’s admissions selectivity, start-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Specifically, both schools and students did not always receive accurate information on how the “limited 
unscreened” preference was exerted by Small Schools of Choice and there was conflicting information on 
this preference in the 2003-2004 NYC High School Directory (2004).  
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up year (small schools of choice fulfill the “limited unscreened admissions category” and 
were created between 2002 and 2008), and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) 
administrative records (all small schools of choice received at least a small amount of 
start-up funds from BMGF during this time period). I deleted all students that never 
chose a small school of choice and excluded students that are not enrolled in NYC public 
high school during eighth-grade.  
I then merged the HSAPS data with students’ 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 
2008-2009 enrollment and discharge files by their unique district identifier.  If a student 
had graduated8, dropped out or moved away, this was indicated on their discharge file. If 
there was no discharge information for them, they were still enrolled in the NYC DOE at 
the end of 2009.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In order to graduate from a NYC public high school a student must attain a Local, Regents or Advanced 
Regents diploma from New York State (NYS), attainment of all diploma types is indicated on students’ 
NYC DOE discharge files. 
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Appendix D: Subsample of First-Choice Students 
As a sensitivity test of whether conducting these analyses on a sample containing 
multiple student observations biases the findings, I addressed research questions one and 
two a second time, in a single-observation per student dataset for a sample of students 
who selected an SSC as their first choice. I present findings from this subsetted sample in 
Appendix Tables D.1 and D.2.  I find that they are strikingly similar to the results from 
the full dataset, and hence report on the latter in the text.    	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Appendix E: Attrition from the Sample 
Roughly 27 percent of the eighth-graders district-wide that participated in the 
HSAPS process in 2004-2005 did not stay in NYC public schools through four years of 
high school and either moved out of the district or transferred to private/parochial 
schools. These students cannot be included in the sample when answering the second 
research question, as their high school graduation data is missing.  
This attrition constrains the generalizability of my findings to students that remain 
in New York City Public Schools through four years of high school. In an effort to 
understand whether the relationship between a student making contact with a school on 
their choice list in eighth-grade and their probability of graduating high school for years 
later may be different for students that left the sample I investigated whether certain types 
of students had a higher probability of leaving the sample than others. Specifically, in 
Appendix Tables E.1 and E.2 I present an analysis of the relationship between a student’s 
characteristics (including whether or not they made contact with an SSC on their choice 
list) and their probability of leaving the sample. I find that that while being overage for 
grade in eighth-grade and qualifying for special-education services are strong predictors 
of whether a student will leave the sample, there is no relationship between whether a 
student makes contact with a SSC on their choice list and their probability of leaving the 
sample.	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Tables 	  	  	  
Table 1. Parameter estimates and approximate p-values for a fitted  logistic regression model predicting 
the  relationship between whether a student makes contact with a SSC school on their choice list (vs. 
does not make contact) and their free-/reduced-price lunch status, their eighth-grade state standardized 
test scores, whether they were overage for grade in eighth-grade, whether they are an English Language 
Learner and whether they qualify for Special Education Services, for a sample of 26,813 students.  
            
8th grade 
characteristic   Model  1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  0.619*** -8.390*** 0.852*** -4.277*** 
Frlunch  -0.233*** -0.155*** -0.203*** -0.157*** 
PriorM   0.194***  0.184*** 
PriorR   0.242***  0.231*** 
Absent   -0.605***  -0.596*** 
Overage    -0.511*** -0.356*** 
SPED    -0.740*** -0.398*** 
ELL       -0.147*** 0.105 
R2  0.004 0.149 0.051 0.156 
-2LL  35624.190 
32581.830 34601.622 32373.088 
H0    
 
 
βFRLUNCH,  βABSENT, 
βPriorM, βPriorR, 
βOverage,βSPED,βELL=0 
Difference in -2LL     
-3331.556 
df     
7 
Decision   
 
 Reject H0 
Key: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 	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Table 2. Parameter estimates and approximate p-values for fitted  logistic 
regression models predicting the relationship between a student's probability of 
graduating high school in four years and whether they made contact with at 
least one SSC school on their choice list (vs. does not make contact), their free-
/reduced-price lunch status, the number of times they were absent in eighth-
grade, their eighth-grade state standardized test scores, whether they were 
overage for grade in eighth-grade, whether they are an English Language 
Learner and whether they qualify for Special Education Services, for a sample 
of 21,400 students.  
      Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept   -0.022** 0.468*** 
Contact   0.806*** 0.294*** 
Frlunch    -0.118*** 
PriorM    0.383*** 
PriorR    0.418*** 
Absent    -0.562*** 
Overage    -0.477*** 
SPED    -0.090*** ELL       0.192*** 
R2   0.05 0.26 
-2LL     27736.84 23890.52 
H0    
βFRLunch, 
βPriorM, 
βPriorR, 
βAbsent, 
βOverage, 
βSPED, 
βELL=0 
Difference in -2LL    3846.32 
df    6 
Decision       Reject H0 
Key: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and approximate p-values for fitted  logistic 
regression models predicting the relationship between a student's probability of 
dropping out of high school in four years and whether they made contact with at 
least one SSC school on their choice list (vs. does not make contact), their free-
/reduced-price lunch status, the number of times they were absent in eighth-
grade, their eighth-grade state standardized test scores, whether they were 
overage for grade in eighth-grade, whether they are an English Language 
Learner and whether they qualify for Special Education Services, for a sample 
of 26,813 students.  
      Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept   -1.501*** -2.058*** 
Contact   -0.543*** -0.128** 
Frlunch    -0.052** 
PriorM    -0.043** 
PriorR    -0.116*** 
Absent    0.351*** 
Overage    0.911*** 
SPED    0.002** ELL       0.018* 
R2   0.02 0.11 
-2LL     21540.67 20012.67 
H0    
βFRLunch, 
βPriorM, 
βPriorR, 
βAbsent, 
βOverage, 
βSPED, 
βELL=0 
Difference in -2LL    1528.00 
df    6 
Decision       Reject H0 
Key: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table	  C.1.	  A	  description	  of	  the	  data	  collected	  for	  the	  study	  (Bloom	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Data Source Sample School Years  Description of Data 
New York City High 
School Application 
Processing System 
(NYC HSAPS)  
 
 
Data were 
available for all 
eighth-grade 
students who 
completed their 
application to the 
High School 
Application 
Processing 
System. 
 
2004-2005 These files contained 
information about the 
school choices and 
rankings made by each 
student, as well as a 
student’s geographic 
priority and “contact” 
status for each school. The 
files also contained the 
program/school to which 
each student was assigned 
by the HSAPS algorithm 
as well as their eighth-
grade demographic 
characteristics.  
NYC DOE June 
enrollment data 
Data were 
available for 6th- 
to 12th-graders 
enrolled in NYC 
public schools. 
This file 
contained all 
students who 
enrolled in grades 
6-12 at any point 
during the school 
year. 
2005-2006 to 
2008-2009 
The June enrollment files 
contained demographic 
and identification 
information for each 
student as of the end of the 
school year. These data 
also provided detailed 
information about each 
student’s disposition at the 
end of the year. 
NYC DOE student 
discharge/transactional 
file 
Data were 
available for all 
high-school 
students in the 
New York City 
public school 
system. Data were 
collected 
throughout the 
school year. 
2005-2006 to 
2008-2009 
The transactional file 
recorded each movement a 
student made into or out of 
a school in the DOE 
system. The final 
transaction a student made 
on this file was used to 
construct the graduation 
measures for this study. 
Administrative records 
provided by the Gates 
Foundation and 
intermediaries 
 
Data were 
available for all 
new small schools 
that started after 
the 2002-2003. 
2002-2003 to 
2008-2009 
 
These school-level data 
contained information on 
whether a new small 
school was started with 
funding from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Table D.1 Parameter estimates and approximate p-values for a logistic regression model displaying 
the fitted relationship between whether a student attrits from the sample and whether they make 
contact with an SSC, controlling for their free-/reduced-price lunch status, their 8th grade 
standardized state test scores, whether they were overage for grade in 8th grade, if they are an 
English Language Learner and  if they qualify for Special Education services, for a sample of 
26,813 students.  
	  	  
  Model 1 
Intercept -1.112***  
Contact 0.051  
FRLunch -0.063  
PriorM 0.001  
PriorR 0.001  
Overage -0.442***  
ELL -0.042  
SPED 0.641***  
R2 0.054 
-2LL 70182.764 
Key: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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